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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction to review the Final Order by the Eighth Judicial District
Court pursuant to UTAH

CODE ANN.

§ 78A-3-102(3)(j)(2008) and § 78A-4-

103(2)(j)(2008). This case involves the timely appeal by Defendant Pipe Renewal
Service, LLC (herein "PRS LLC") and the timely Cross-Appeal by Plaintiff Ray Hunting
(or "Ray") from a final order issued on August 6, 2007, by the Honorable John R.
Anderson, Eighth Judicial District Court Judge.
A RE-STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES OF CROSS-APPELLANT
RAY HUNTING
Pursuant to Rule 24(b)(1) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, PRS LLC
respectfully disagrees with Ray's statement of the issues and the standards of review
identified by Ray and therefore restates the issues and provides the appropriate standards
of review as follows:
1.

Should the Court of Appeals overturn the Trial Court's holding that the

Plaintiff was not damaged, and arbitrarily award the Plaintiff $264,000.00 in treble
damages?
Standard of Review: The standard of review on the damages determination is a
question of fact and is reviewed under a clear error standard. See Judd ex reL
Montgomery v. Drezga, 2004 UT 91, f 34, 103 P.3d 135 (recognizing that "damages are a
question of fact"); State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935 (Utah 1994) ("Trial courts are given
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primary responsibility for making determinations of fact. Findings of fact are reviewed by
an appellate court under the clearly erroneous standard.").
2.

Did the Trial Court err by requiring the Plaintiff to present evidence

concerning the reasonableness of requested damages rather than summarily granting the
Plaintiff all the damages requested?
Standard of Review; The standard of review on this issue is a clear error standard
because Trial courts are given primary responsibility for making determinations of fact.
State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935 (Utah 1994) ("Trial courts are given primary
responsibility for making determinations of fact. Findings of fact are reviewed by an
appellate court under the clearly erroneous standard.'1).
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Purstmm to Rule 24ibH h -Hh,< I tah Rules of Appellate Procedaie. PRS I T C
respectfully disagrees v\nh Ra; \s Statement of die ' \\>.e arid tli^iL-forc restates the case as
follows:
N A i LIRE O F THE C A S E
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resei ving the issue of damages for a later hearing. PRS LLC petitioned the com t for
reconsideration of the evidence presented in opposition to Ray's motion, and for
clarification of the Court' s 11 il ing. (R 3^1- ' *: K-. P. 4 72 - J •J" •'
2.

A 1 1 ioi ig other tl lii tgs, PR S I I C ai gtied that it had pt csented si lfficiei it

evidence •: i\\ \h: v.rm ui" die lea^e agreement) to create a material dispute as to whether

Ray could maintain an action without joining proper parties. (R. 472-495). Two months
later the court entertained oral arguments on PRS LLC's motions, but nevertheless
affirmed its earlier ruling. (R. 594-599). Again, the Trial Court did not address the issue
of damages. Therefore, PRS LLC filed a motion for summary judgment on the issue of
damages which was ultimately denied.
3.

In the Trial Court's ruling on damages it ruled that "Even if the LLC had

moved, Mr. Hunting would have had no right to possession of the premises as against the
corporation. Mr. Hunting, therefore, suffered no actual damages." (R. 819) On this basis
the Court refused to treble damages. The Trial Court then awarded "unpaid rent",
apparently as something other than damages. The court's final order, which was not
accompanied by a separate Findings of Fact or Conclusions of Law, awarded Ray a
judgment against PRS LLC in the total sum of $88,174.50, which is calculated as unpaid
rent from September of 2005 through December of 2006 in the amount of $88,000.00,
and costs in the amount of $174.50. (R. 840-843). The issue of the eviction of PRS LLC,
having become moot, was not an issue at the time of the final order.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW

On September 16, 2005, Ray caused a "Three Day Notice to Pay Rent or Vacate."
On October 19, 2005, Ray filed a Complaint against PRS LLC but named it as a Utah
Corporation. On June 5, 2006, Ray filed an Amended Complaint which made his
intention clear to sue PRS LLC.
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On September 2 !, "M;*SK Ra} f;:ed a Motion for Summary Judgment. On
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Entry of Final Judgment and granting, in part, PRS LLC's Motion to Strike. The Trial
Court also expressly denied Ray's several requests to have the Trial Court presume and
declare PRS Corporation's lease abandoned. (R. 820).
Ray was awarded a judgment against PRS LLC in the total sum of $88,174.50,
which is calculated as unpaid rent from September of 2005 through December of 2006 in
the amount of $88,000.00, and costs in the amount of $174.50.

STATEMENT OF FACTS 1

Appellee, Ray, is an individual who resides in Uintah County, State of Utah.
Appellant, PRS LLC, is a Utah Limited Liability Company engaged in the business of
maintenance, construction, handling, restoration, repairs, purchase and sale of oil field
production equipment and other related activities. (R. 1; R. 720).

1

PRS LLC's restatement of the facts is primarily necessitated by inaccuracies
contained in Ray's "Statement of Facts". At page 8 of Ray's Brief, Ray claims that
"uncontested facts" were deemed admitted pursuant to Rule 7(c)(3) of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure. This assertion is incorrect. The bulk of Ray's supposed "uncontested
facts" were refuted by PRS LLC's Memorandum In Opposition to Summary Judgment
(R. 251-279) which did not rely on mere denials but rather the accompanying Exhibits.
See also Footnote 7 for additional argument on this point. Furthermore, the Trial Court's
ruling does not reflect Ray's position that the alleged "uncontested facts" were deemed
admitted pursuant to Rule 7(c)(3). See R. 340-343.
Likewise on page 11 of Ray's Brief it is asserted that "facts presented to the Trial
Court in Ray's Damages Motion..were unopposed by PRS LLC below." In actuality,
many of the alleged facts were vigorously debated by the parties. (R. 744-768; R. 784793).
-6-

Ray and Marilyn Hunting are the owners of the real property known as 5500 East
5750 South, Vernal, Uintah County, State of Utah (hereinafter "Premises"), consisting of
approximately 20.5 acres of land. (R. 1).
On December 19, 1991, the parties entered into a written lease agreement for the
purpose of reducing their prior verbal lease agreement to writing wherein Huntings are
named "Owner" and PRS Corporation is named "Tenant." (R. 182-186, 192-193; R. 719720). At the time of the initiation of the lease, the leasehold originally furnished by Ray
consisted of the shell of the main warehouse building and farmland. (R. 756-768). The
Lease Agreement has a term of fifty (50) years. (R. 192-193; R. 384-388). PRS
Corporation currently occupies, and has continuously occupied the Premises since the mid
1980s. (R. 382-388). In reliance upon the 50 year term of the lease PRS Corporation has
made substantial improvements to the Premises. (R. 382-388).
At no time during the more than twenty year period that PRS Corporation has
occupied the Premises pursuant to the lease agreement has it breached the terms of either
the verbal lease agreement or the written Lease Agreement. (R. 184; R. 252; R. 872 p. 9).
At no previous time has Ray initiated litigation to challenge the validity of either the
verbal lease agreement or the written Lease Agreement or any of the terms thereof. (R.
184; R. 252). Ray has received, each and every month, the agreed upon sum of $2,000.00
outlined in the Agreement. (R. 182-200, R.371-388 at 8;) (R.371-388; 755-768).
In 2004 PRS Corporation created additional business entities to better serve its
growing needs. One such entity was PRS LLC. (R. 872 p. 5; R. 382-388; R. 755-768).
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The limited liability company served as a managerial entity overseeing the day-to-day
needs of the various business entities' operations. Accordingly, it paid many of the
corporations' bills including rent to Ray. (R. 719-721).

For approximately 18 months

said practice continued without objection from the Ray. (R. 872 pp. 5-6; R. 755-768).
No notice for failure to pay rent or inquiry as to why the check came from "Pipe Renewal
Service, LLC" rather than "Pipe Renewal Service, Inc." was ever sent. (R. 872 p. 7).
Then on August 15, 2005, Ray sent PRS LLC a notice of rent increase. (R. 6). The notice
stated that Ray knew not with whom he dealt, that he had no contract with PRS LLC, and
that monthly rent was increased from $2,000.00 to $7,500.00 per month (R. 6). See
generally R. 755-768.
During the course of the proceedings, Ray motioned the trial court for summary
judgment. (R. 138-140). In defense, PRS LLC submitted the lease agreement between
Ray and PRS Corp and asserted that the right of possession properly flowed from the
tenant - not Ray. (R. 251-279). However, the trial court concluded that PRS LLC had
not responded by affidavit and that it was therefore justified in granting summary
judgment in favor of Ray, but it reserved the issue of damages for a later hearing. (R.
340-343).
In response to the Trial Court's ruling, the PRS LLC filed a motion for
reconsideration on several grounds. (R. 369-370). One such reason was that Ray failed to
join the PRS Corporation as a necessary party. (R. 377). The LLC also urged the court to
modify its ruling on the basis that the lease agreement meet the requirements for a self-
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authenticating document under Rule 902(8) of the Utah Rules of Evidence. (R. 373-374).
After the parties were given an opportunity to appropriately brief the issues, the Trial
Court entered a ruling in which it set the motion for a hearing and stated "the Court is
prepared to order PRS, Inc. be joined, and that it would do so unless "the parties can
adequately explain why PRS, Inc. should not be joined". (R. 577-580). At the hearing
PRS LLC asserted that PRS Corporation and others were necessary parties. (R. 872 p. 5,
p. 11). The Plaintiff asserted that PRS LLC was the only necessary party and presented
four cases, for the first time at the hearing, which Ray believed supported this assertion.
(R. 872 p. 15).
With only a brief opportunity to glance over the cases during the hearing PRS LLC
asserted that all four cases were inapplicable as they dealt with situations where the
additional parties entered the premises after the defendant had been served with the three
day notice. (R. 872 pp. 27-28). The court took the issue under advisement and ultimately
sided with PRS LLC on this issue. (R. 594-599). In its Ruling, the Trial Court
distinguished Ray's cases and stated that the "Court is still not convinced that PRS, Inc. is
not a necessary party." (Id.) (Feb 1st Ruling). Nevertheless, still the Court did not join
the Corporation as a party nor did it require Ray to amend his complaint. (Id.)
The issue of damages remained outstanding, but the issue of eviction had become
moot by Ray's own admission as the PRS LLC had vacated the property. The Court
refused to enter an order of restitution on the basis that it would adversely affect the rights
of at least two other business entities who were occupying the property, but who had not
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been made a party to any preceding. (Id.) After entertaining three additional motions the
court entered a final judgment in favor of Ray in the total sum of $88,174.50, which was
calculated as unpaid rent from September of 2005 through December of 2006 in the
amount of $88,000.00, and costs in the amount of $174.50. (R. 819-822).
The Trial Court held that Ray suffered no actual damages and that based on
Perkins v. Spencer, 243 P.2d 446 (Utah 1952), that the Plaintiff was not entitled to treble
damages. The Court stated the following, as set forth in the record, as the basis therefore:

"ON THIS POINT, THE COURT IS PERSUADED BY PERKINS V. SPENCER,
243 P.2d 446 (UTAH 1952) WHICH CLEARLY ADDRESSES THE ISSUE OF
WHETHER TREBLE DAMAGES FOR UNLAWFUL DETAINER ARE
APPROPRIATE WHEN A NON-PARTY TO THE SUIT ENJOYS POSSESSION
OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY. WHILE THE CASES ARE
DISTINGUISHABLE ON SOME FACTUAL POINTS, THE FACT OF THE
MATTER REMAINS THAT "SO LONG AS [PRS, INC.] REMAINED IN
POSSESSION, IT IS DIFFICULT TO SEE HOW [MR. HUNTING] COULD BE
DAMAGED BY THE FACT THAT [PRS LLC] REMAINED THERE. EVEN IF
[THE LLC] HAD MOVED, [MR. HUNTING] WOULD HAVE NO RIGHT OF
POSSESSION OF THE PREMISES AS AGAINST [THE CORPORATION].
[MR. HUNTING], THEREFORE, SUFFERED NO ACTUAL DAMAGE." SEE
Id. AT 449." (R. 819-820).
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

A.

SUMMARY OF REPLY ARGUMENT ON PRS LLC'S APPEAL

In his Brief, Ray argues that PRS Corporation and other business entities
occupying the leasehold are not necessary parties. Ray's assertion is based on Holmes
Development, LLC v. Cook, and is accompanied by an attempt to discredit and disregard a
portion of the record below by unilaterally declaring PRS LLC's evidence as
incompetent. Ray also seeks to modify the Trial Courts ruling and declare PRS
Corporation's lease abandoned. Finally, Ray argues that the Court should consider PRS
LLC's appeal pursuant to an older version of UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-36-7.
In reply, PRS LLC asserts that Holmes Development, LLC v. Cook is completely
irrelevant to these facts when considering the question of joinder. PRS LLC notes that
Ray also repeatedly urged the Trial Court to declare PRS Corporation's lease abandoned,
but the Trial Court expressly refused to do so in several of its rulings. This issue was not
appealed and is therefore moot. All attempts to interject an assumption that the lease was
abandoned should not be well taken. PRS LLC also asserts that both versions of UTAH
CODE ANN. § 78-36-7 mandate the joinder of PRS Corporation.
PRS LLC asserts that allowing Ray to maintain an action for unlawful detainer
without necessary parties constitutes a revision of Utah's Forcible Entry and Detainer Act
and a violation of Rule 19 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. On the issue of summary
judgment, the evidence submitted clearly demonstrates a genuine issue of material fact as
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to whether Ray could properly maintain an action pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. §
78-36-7.

Ray should not be allowed to shop for the weakest defendant, circumvent

Rule 19 and UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-36-7, and improperly recover theoretical damages
when suffering no actual damages.

B.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ON CROSS-APPELLANT RAY HUNTING'S
APPEAL

The Trial Court properly denied treble damages. The Trial Court expressly ruled
that Ray suffered no actual damage. Therefore, PRS LLC submits that the Trial Court
ruling implies that there are no damage amounts to treble. However, as is argued in PRS
LLC's Brief of Appellant, the Trial Court's attempt to grant $88,000.00 as rent rather
than damages is clearly improper pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-36-10.
PRS LLC acknowledges that the Trial Court's failure to require adherence to Rule
19 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure limited its ability to properly rule on the issue of
damages. PRS LLC agrees with Ray's assertions that UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-36-10
mandates treble damages when a defendant is found to be in unlawful detainer. However,
PRS LLC argues that UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-36-10 should never become applicable
unless and until proper parties are joined pursuant to Rule 19 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure in addition to those parties necessary to maintain an action for unlawful
detainer pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-36-7.
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Utah's Forcible Entry and Detainer Act seeks to safeguard property rights and is
not aimed at generating theoretical damage income for landlords. Inasmuch as the Trial
Court properly concluded that Ray suffered no actual damages, it is nonsensical to award
treble damages on legal theory.

-13-

ARGUMENT

I.

ALLOWING THE PLAINTIFF TO MAINTAIN AN ACTION FOR UNLAWFUL DETAINER
WITHOUT NECESSARY PARTIES WOULD CONSTITUTE A REVISION OF UTAH'S
FORCIBLE ENTRY AND DETAINER ACT AND A VIOLATION OF RULE 19 OF THE
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

A.
PRS Corporation and other business entities occupying the leasehold
are clearly necessary parties
In response to PRS LLC's Brief which outlined applicable Utah law mandating the
joinder of PRS Corporation and other entities, Ray responded with three basic arguments.
First, he asserts that the Court should consider the 2005 version of UTAH CODE ANN. §
78-36-7, and that this pre-2007 Utah Code better supports his position. Next, it is argued
that the issue of joinder was not properly preserved for an appeal. Finally, Ray suggests
that no evidence was submitted indicating the presence of other persons or entities
occupying the property.
To the argument that the Court should consider the appeal in light of the 2005
version of

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 78-36-7, PRS LLC will acquiesce. This statute was the

governing law when the case was initiated, and better supports PRS LLC's contentions
anyway. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-36-7 (1993) mandates that tenant and subtenants "in
actual occupation of the premises when the action is commenced, shall be made a party
defendant in the proceeding". UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-36-7(1). Thus, it is clear that
tenants and subtenants occupying the property when the action is commenced are
mandatory parties to the action. Furthermore, Rule 19 states that those parties in whose

-14-

"absence complete relief cannot be accorded" must be joined. Utah R. Civ. P. Rule
19(a). Said Rule also dictates who is responsible for the mandated joinder, by stating
that the "Pleader", here Ray, shall either join all parties necessary for complete relief2 or
it "shall state" the names of those parties not joined and "state[d] the reasons why they are
not joined." Utah R. Civ. P. Rule 19(c). Ray has not followed the Statute or the Rule in
this matter.
Second, attempting to deflect PRS LLC's joinder claims, Ray argues that the issue
of joinder was not properly preserved for an appeal. Preservation of an issue for appeal

2

Pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-36-10, complete relief in an unlawful detainer
action "shall include an order for the restitution of the premises." UTAH CODE ANN. §
78-36-10(1). In the current case, the Trial Court properly held that it would not
adjudicate the rights of persons or entities in occupation of the premises who were not
parties to the litigation, and therefore refused to issue an order of restitution. (R. 595; R.
817-822,820).
In fact, in its July 2, 2007 Ruling the Trial Court expressly stated that:
"First, there is no question that even if the Defendant had vacated the premises
after receiving the Plaintiffs three-day notice to pay or vacate (or at any time
thereafter, for that matter), this Court would not have been in a position to restore
possession of the subject property to the Plaintiff (R. 820-821).
This July 2nd Ruling echoed previous rulings by the Trial Court. For example, in
its February 1st Ruling, the Trial Court stated:
"...the Court is still not convinced that PRS, Inc. is not a necessary party to this
suit, insofar as it appears to the Court that the Plaintiff desires to re-enter and
obtain full possession of the subject property." (R. 597)
Thus, it is implicit in the Trial Courts own rulings that Ray did not join necessary
parties. However, for some reason, Ray was allowed to proceed with the litigation. As a
result, the relationship between PRS Corporation and Ray was never considered by the
Court, and PRS LLC was left with $88,000.00 in rent it did not owe.
-15-

is based on whether the issue was disclosed to the trier and whether the trial court was on
notice of the issue raised on appeal. Main Street v. Easy Heat, Inc, 2004 99 P.3d 801,
507 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 2004 UT 72. When the issue on appeal is raised before the trial
court, and when the Trial Court has entered rulings on the matter, the issue is preserved.
Ellis v. Swensen, 2000, 16 P.3d 1233, 411 Utah Adv. Rep. 13, 2000 UT 101. Here,
joinder was a central issue for nearly eight months of the litigation below.
Nevertheless, in Ray's Brief at footnote 6, page 15, there is an elaborate attempt to
discredit eight months of record on the issue.3 Attempting to discredit sources, raising the
issue of joinder, Ray proclaims that trial court rulings on the issue cannot preserve issues
for appeal but cites no legal authority. Ray also tries to implement a strange six month
rule a rule, but again cites no legal authority. Footnote 6 also contains inaccuracies
concerning the record. For example, it proclaims that PRS LLC's Reply Memorandum in
Support of Motion to Reconsider contains no mention of joinder. However, pages 10-11
3

PRS LLC has not requested the Court's Record as was done by Ray and perhaps
there are some discrepancies between the record numbers allocated in the record index
and the actual numbers on the Court's file. Nevertheless, the record is saturated with both
argument and rulings on the issue of proper parties to this action. Some of the more
notable of which are the following:
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.
F.
G.

PRS LLC's Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to Reconsider (R.
427-495)
Ruling dated 1/08/07. (R. 577-580).
The entirety of Transcript of Oral Argument on January 30, 2007. (R. 872)
Ruling dated 2/02/07. (R. 594-599).
PRS LLC's Memorandum In Support of Summary Judgment on Issue of
Damages. (R. 602-607).
PRS LLC's Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Award Final
Damages. (R. 744-768).
Ruling dated 7/2/07. (R. 817-822).
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contain said argument under the heading "The obligation to join PRS Corporation to this
litigation firmly rests with the Plaintiff and is only fatal to his case." (R. 482 based on the
record index).
PRS LLC can articulate a litany of additional flaws with Ray's assertion that the
issue of joinder wras not properly raised. However, the record is so clear concerning
joinder that belaboring the point is unnecessary. The apparent goal of Ray's argument
concerning the issue of joinder is to have the Court review the issue with a correction of
error "standard of review". PRS LLC believes that a correction of error review is
actually more favorable to its appeal on this issue, but in sincerity must maintain that the
issue was properly preserved belowr.
B.
Holmes Development, LLC v. Cook is completely irrelevant to the facts
of this appeal.
Ray has continually argued that Holmes should be outcome determinative in this
case. However, Holmes stands for the proposition that one who is not a party to the
contract cannot assert the rights of that contract. Holmes Development, LLC v. Cook, 48
P.3d 895 (Utah 2002). Defendant agrees with this statement of law, but argues it is
wholly irrelevant and inapplicable to the case at hand. PRS LLC asserts no rights under
the Lease Agreement. Rather, PRS LLC argues that the lease agreement is evidence,
which was properly before the Trial Court, that indicates Ray cannot properly maintain an
action solely against PRS LLC pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-36-7 (1993). The
lease agreement is merely evidence that Ray currently does not enjoy right of possession
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to the leasehold, and that proper parties have not been joined pursuant to Utah's Forcible
Entry and Detainer Act.4
As is previously stated, the Trial Court's rulings essentially hold that proper parties
were not joined. In the Trial Court's final ruling it stated "there is no question that even if
the Defendant had vacated the premises after receiving the Plaintiffs three-day notice to
pay or vacate (or at any time thereafter, for that matter), this Court would not have been in
a position to restore possession of the subject property to the Plaintiff." (R. 820-821). If
PRS LLC were attempting to assert rights under the lease agreement then Holmes would
be applicable, but PRS LLC has long asserted that "Pipe Renewal Service, LLC occupies
the premises at the whim and by permission of the Lessee, PRS Corporation." (R. 480).
C.
The Trial Court expressly refused to declare PRS Corporation's lease
abandoned, and this issue is not properly before the Court of Appeals.
Ray's brief repeatedly attempts to insert the presumption that the lease was
abandoned. However, the Trial Court expressly refused to presume the lease was
abandoned and stated:
"The Plaintiff urges the Court to presume that PRS, Inc. had abandoned the lease...
The Court will not presume that PRS, Inc. abandoned the lease without having
PRS, Inc. as a party to the suit. Therefor j , the presumption of abandonment will
not be entertained, or relied upon, by the Court." (R. 820).

4

Ray's argument on Holmes consistency ignores the fact that regardless of
whether contract law allows the lease agreement to be used for anything by any third
party, it may nevertheless be very relevant evidence in determining whether a plaintiff has
properly joined all necessary parties required to maintain an action pursuant to UTAH
CODE ANN. §78-36-7.
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This ruling was not appealed 5 and is therefore not properly before the Court. The issue
of abandonment is therefore moot. All attempts to interject an assumption that the lease
was abandoned should not be well taken .6
D.
Ray's position on the issue of joinder constitutes a revision of Utah's
Forcible Entry and Detainer Act and Violates Rule 19 of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure
If Ray is allowed to properly maintain this action for unlawful detainer without
joining other parties, this Court's ruling will effectively constitute a revision of Utah's
Forcible Entry and Detainer Act and Rule 19 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The
change will mean a landlord whose premises are sublet will be able to sue a subtenant of
his or her choosing with the knowledge that even though he will not be entitled to
restitution of the property, damages for unlawful detainer may be obtained if the tenant
does not elect to intervene.

5

PRS LLC notes that the issue of abandonment is not mentioned anywhere in
Ray's Docketing Statement or as an issue in the Brief of Cross-Appellant.
6

Likewise, Ray attempts to interject an incorrect assumption concerning payments
of rent. In at least footnotes 7, 12, 13, and 20, Ray argues that rent was not paid by PRS
Corporation. This is incorrect and at odds with the record. Rent was paid by PRS
Corporation, but in 2005 it was decided that Ray did not like the name on the checks. In
footnote 7 Ray somewhat recognizes the fact that he received the $2,000 monthly rental
payment, required pursuant to the lease agreement, but just wants to apply it to whichever
entity best serves the current legal ambitions. Nothing in the lease agreement gives Ray a
right to demand a check from any specific entity or person. Furthermore, this issue relates
to the question of abandonment which is not before this Court at this time.
The record below, including argument from counsel in nearly every memorandum
(R. 182-200, R. 371-388 at 8), and the testimony in two affidavits (R.371-388; 755-768) is
that the correct amount of rent, $2,000, was paid each and every month.
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Here, Ray was aware that the lease agreement only named PRS Corporation.
Therefore, PRS LLC being the weaker defendant was sued. When PRS Corporation did
not intervene it was simply argued that Holmes was controlling and that the lease
agreement could not be considered for any puipose. However, as has been argued, both
the Utah Code and the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure guard against this type of
"defendant shopping." UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-36-7 states that those in possession at the
time the case was initiated must be joined. U TAH CODE ANN. § 78-36-10 states complete
relief in an unlawful detainer action must include an order of restitution. Rule 19 of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure mandates that necessary parties for complete relief must be
joined, and puts the obligation on the plaintiff to accomplish the joinder. Adherence to
these rules and statutes is necessary in order to prevent injustice, and Ray should be
required to adhere to the same.

II.

THE EVIDENCE SUBMITTED, WHEN CONSIDERED WITH THE TRIAL COURT'S OWN
RULINGS, CLEARLY DEMONSTRATES A GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT AS TO
WHETHER THE PLAINTIFF COULD PROPERLY MAINTAIN AN ACTION PURSUANT
TO UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-36-7

Ray's Brief effectively exhausts seven pages of argument on the single assertion
that PRS LLC did not introduce any admissible evidence of material fact.7 This assertion
7

Ray's brief cites several cases which are believed to make this point. However,
cases such as Busch Corp. VState Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 743 P.2d 1217, 1219 (Utah
1987), Bluffdale City v. Smith, 2007 UT App 25 f 12, 156 P.3d 175, and Poteet v. White,
2006 UT 63, f 7, 147 P.3d 439 are all distinguishable from the case now before the Court.
These cases all involved situations where the non-moving party relied solely on denials.
In the case now before the Court, PRS LLC did not rely on mere denials, but
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is clearly incorrect. Indeed, the Court's original stated basis for the granting of Ray's
Motion for Summary Judgment was that "the Defendant has not responded by affidavit."
(R. 342). The Trial Court made this ruling despite the fact that the lease agreement was
used as the support for the denials in PRS LLC's Memorandum in Opposition to
Summary Judgment and was submitted concurrently therewith. (R. 251-279). The Trial
Courts' ruling does not adhere to Rule 902 of the Utah Rules of Evidence which state that
acknowledged documents are self-authenticating. Rule 902, in relevant part, states:
u

(8) Acknowledged Documents. Documents accompanied by a certificate
of acknowledgment executed in the manner provided by law by a notary
public or other officer authorized by law to take acknowledgments." UTAH
R. EVID. 902(8).
The 1991 Lease Agreement contains a certificate of acknowledgment, the mark of
the notary public, and was executed by Ray who is a party to this litigation.8 Ray now

supported those denials with a lease agreement signed by the moving party before a
notary.
For the same reasons, PRS LLC disagrees with Ray's extensive argument on Rule
7(c)(3)(B) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. A review of PRS LLC's Memorandum
in Opposition to Summary Judgment reveals that nearly every factual allegation was
denied on the basis of the lease agreement, and said lease agreement was attached thereto
as Exhibit A. (R. 251-279). It makes no sense to submit an affidavit alleging a lease
agreement, when you can submit the actual agreement which is signed by the moving
party in front of the notary. The same as the affidavit would be. On this basis the actual
notarized agreement was submitted as the basis for the denials. The lease agreement
complies with Rule 7(c)(3)'s requirement that allegations not be merely denied.
Therefore, the entirety of footnotes 15, 16, and 17 should not be well taken.
8

In footnote 21 of Ray's Brief it is alleged that Ray was not on notice of the lease
agreement. Given the fact that Ray is a party to the lease agreement this is clearly not the
case. (R. 251-279) The lease agreement was included in discovery. Furthermore, the
affirmative defense of estoppel is raised in PRS LLC's Answer. The Third Defense in
Defendant's Answer to the Amended Complaint states, uRay Hunting's claims are barred
-21-

argues that the Court did not exclude the lease agreement, that it was considered, but that
the Trial Court believed the lease agreement insignificant to create a genuine issue of
material fact. Brief of Appellee at 26.
However, PRS LLC respectfully submits that the Utah Legislature made the lease
agreement a genuine issue of material fact when it passed UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-36-7(1)
mandating the joinder of all parties in possession of the premises when the action is
commenced. Utah Courts have also made the issue of evidence suggesting parties in
possession to be a material fact by holding that if the object of the action is to recover
possession or use of property, then parties who are in possession and claim an interest in
the property are necessary and indispensable parties to the action.9 Bonneville Tower
Condominium Management Committee v. Thompson Michie Associates, Inc., 728 P.2d
1017(1986).
Summary judgment is only appropriate where there is no genuine issue of material
fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Utah R. Civ. P. Rule

by the doctrine of estoppel." The Lease Agreement supplies the factual basis for this
defense.
9

On page 22 of Ray's Brief he makes a futile attempt to distinguish Bonneville
from the case now before the Court. Essentially, Ray argues that Bonneville only
involved an action to recover possession of property, and that because Bonneville was not
an unlawful detainer action seeking to recover possession of property it is "easily
distinguishable." This argument completely disregards the holding. Bonneville stands for
the simple proposition that if the object of the action is to recover possession or use of
property, then parties who are in possession and claim an interest in the property are
necessary and indispensable parties. Id. Ray's initial action sought to recover the
possession and use of the property. Ray now seems to shy away from these requests
which is futile given that it is mandated by statute.
-22-

56(c). The court is to consider the evidence in a light most favorable to the non-moving
party. Additionally, the summary judgment rule permits excursions even beyond the
pleading. Continental Bank & Trust Co. v. Cunningham, 353 P.2d 168 (Utah 1960).
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 78-36-7(1) (1992) makes evidence concerning additional

individuals/entities occupying the premises material.
Therefore, if the Trial Court could have reasonably concluded from the lease
agreement that other parties were occupying the premises when the action was
commenced, summary judgment should have been denied.10 Yet, ironically the Trial
Court essentially made findings that additional parties were and had been in possession of
the premises, but nevertheless granted summary judgment.11 PRS LLC also notes that

10

Summary judgment should be granted only if pleadings, depositions, admissions,
and affidavits, if any, show without dispute that the party seeking summary judgment is
entitled to prevail. Gilmor v. Carter, 391 P.2d 426 (1964). Summary judgment is a
drastic remedy and should be granted with reluctance. Housley v. Anaconda Co, All P.2d
390 (Utah 1967). The Court is to consider the situation in a light most favorable to the
non-moving party. Miller v. Celebration Mining Co., 29 P.3d 1231 (Utah 2001).
11

Some of the more concise rulings on this issue are the following:

"In fact, both parties, to some extent, have relied upon the existence of PRS, Inc."
(R.579)
"Having reviewed the records, and according ro the pleadings submitted by both
parties, the Court believes that there are third parties which have not been made
part of this lawsuit, but which have rights related to the underlying property."
(R.580).
"First, there is no question that even if the Defendant had vacated the premises
after receiving the Plaintiffs three-day notice to pay or vacate (or at any time
thereafter, for that matter), this Court would not have been in a position to restore
possession of the subject property to the Plaintiff (R. 820-821).
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subsequent to the Trial Court's ruling on summary judgment, two separate affidavits were
also submitted by corporate officers attesting to the duration of PRS Corporation's
occupancy of the leasehold and of the relationship between PRS LLC and PRS
Corporation. (R.371-388; 755-768).12 PRS LLC submits that a sufficient showing of
evidence displaying Ray's action could not be properly maintained, was made and should
have prevented a ruling on summary judgment. On this basis, and not those urged by
Ray's Brief, PRS LLC respectfully requests that the Court overturn the Trial Court's
ruling in order to provide PRS LLC with an opportunity for a trial where it can subpoena
appropriate witness.

III.

PLAINTIFF SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO SHOP FOR THE WEAKEST DEFENDANT,
CIRCUMVENT RULE 19 AND UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-36-7, AND IMPROPERLY
RECOVER THEORETICAL DAMAGES.

A.
A Plaintiff in an unlawful detainer action should not be allowed to
recover treble damages if there are no actual damages.

"...the Court is still not convinced that PRS, Inc. is not a necessary party to this
suit, insofar as it appears to the Court that the Plaintiff desires to re-enter and
obtain full possession of the subject property." (R. 597).
12

PRS LLC sincerely apologizes to the Court for citing, at times, a document
rather than an exact page. However, as has been previously noted, PRS LLC has not had
the opportunity to examine the Court's record as was done by Ray. In its initial Brief,
PRS LLC cited to the record by using the document page number and the record index.
Ray's Brief suggests that some of the cites to the record are incorrect. PRS LLC has
noted, using Ray's Addendum, that at least the Trial Court's July 2, 2007 Ruling is
numbered in reverse order. These errors make it essentially impossible to pinpoint cite
from the record index.
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On page 35 of Ray's Brief counsel makes a "slippery slope" argument that has no
apparent application to this case. Essentially it is argued, that if a landlord seeking to
recover damages for his loss of use and enjoyment of property is required to actually have
a right to the use and enjoyment of that same property, then a tenant could "litigate and
vacate." This argument displays a complete misunderstanding of the issue13 now before
the Court. PRS LLC agrees that if the landlord had a right to the property at issue it
would not matter under the Unlawful Detainer statute whether the tenant stayed or left
just before final judgment-the tenant would and should be liable for the landlord's
damages just the same.
However, the issue concerning damages now before the Court is an entirely
different one. The Trial Court correctly held that Ray suffered no actual damages. The
question is, should Courts award treble damages while recognizing that there were no
actual damages just because the statute says so?" No. In actuality the statute does not
require damages in this instance, as Ray should not have been allowed to maintain the
action without complying with UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-36-7. Perkins v. Spencer, 243
P.2d 446 (Utah 1952), is the most similar case to the one at hand, and is the case relied on
by the Trial Court in its ruling on damages.

13

Ray's Brief states that PRS LLC's reading of the statute "require[s] an order of
restitution as a prerequisite to the entry of an award for damages." Brief of Appellee at
35. This is simply an incorrect recital of PRS LLC's position. Really, the "order of
restitution" is irrelevant. What is important is that the landlord has a right to the
possession and use of the property and thus suffers actual damages. PRS LLC's position
is ironically identical to the Trial Court's position on this point, in that Ray suffered no
actual damages. Therefore, what is fair and just about awarding damages?
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Ray argued before the Trial Court that Perkins had no relevance to the current case
because of minor factual differences. These arguments were ultimately rejected, but are
now repeated nearly verbatim in Ray's Brief on pages 35 and 36. To these arguments the
Trial Court ruled as follows:
"On this point, the Court is persuaded by Perkins v. Spencer, 243 P.2d 446 (Utah
1952), which (contrary to the Plaintiffs reply memorandum at 8) very clearly
addresses the issue of whether treble damages for unlawful detainer are
appropriate when a non-party to the suit enjoys possession of the subject property.
While the cases are distinguishable on some factual points, the fact of the matter
remains that so long as [PRS, Inc.] remained in possession, it is difficult to see
how [Mr. Hunting] could be damaged by that fact that [PRS, LLC] remained there.
Even if [the LLC] had moved, [Mr. Hunting] would have had no right to
possession of the premises as against [the Corporation]. [Mr. Hunting], therefore,
suffered no actual damage." (R. 817-822).
PRS LLC believes the Trial Court's succinct dismissal of Ray's arguments is
sufficient to state the obvious. As a side argument, Ray again14 urges the Court to
presume the lease abandoned15 even though this issue was not appealed. As previously

14

See pages 18-19 for additional argument on this topic.

15

Again Ray's counsel makes an elaborate attempt to discredit the record on an
issue not appealed. The chosen method for discrediting the record is to state that
information presented to the Trial Court at the oral argument does not count, and that the
affidavits do not count. See footnote 30 of Appellee Brief. The criticisms of the
affidavits ignore paragraph seven of William Lauf s reconsideration affidavit which
states:
"The Corporation is authorized by the Lease Agreement (Exhibit "A") to allow the
LLC to conduct business at the lease premises, and the LLC is authorized by the
Corporation to conduct business at the leased premises. (R. 377) [emphasis
added].
After which Ray's counsel quotes paragraph 8 out of context, which states that
PRS Corporation could terminate its agreements with PRS LLC and continue business as
usual, and then asserts that this information somehow helps Ray's case. The inescapable
facts are that the trier of fact evaluated the lease agreement, affidavits, and information
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outlined, the trier of fact, the Honorable John R. Anderson, expressly refused to accept
this argument. PRS LLC also notes that Ray has not submitted evidence to this effect
because both sides know that the Corporation has and does occupy the property, and that
"both parties, to some extent, have relied upon the existence of PRS, Inc." (R. 579).

B.

"Rent" v. "Damages"

Footnote 29 of Ray's Brief argues that uthe 'rent' v. 'damages' dichotomy relied
on by PRS LLC is irrelevant to the case at bar." Unfortunately, "in the case at bar", this
is not true. PRS LLC agrees that if a defendant is found to be in unlawful detainer, rent
constitutes damages. The problem is, the Trial Court's ruling does not seem to agree. In
one instance the Trial Court states:
"[Mr. Hunting], therefore, suffered no actual damage. See id. [sic] at 449.
Therefore, on this basis, the Court hereby denies Plaintiffs request for any treble
damages in this matter " (R. 819).
However, in the next instance, the Trial Court awards "$0.00 as treble damages" and
"$88,000.00 as unpaid rent." (R. 819).
Thus, the Trial Court seems to be saying the $88,000.00 awarded as "unpaid rent"
is something other than damages. However, as is correctly argued by Ray, after a

and refused to presume that the lease had been abandoned.
In fact, the Trial Court's January ruling expressly stated that "having reviewed the
records, and according to the pleadings submitted by both parties, the Court believes that
there are third parties which have not been made part of this lawsuit, but which have
rights related to the underlying property." (R. 580). Later the Trial Court also notes that
"In fact, both parties, to some extent, have relied upon the existence of PRS, Inc." (R.
579). This was not appealed.
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defendant is found to be in unlawful detainer, there can be nothing but damages. Either
there are no damages and nothing to treble, or amounts awarded should be trebled
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-10. This case is an example of the former.
PRS LLC argues that the Trial Court's January 8th (R.577-580), February 2nd
(R.594-599), and July 2nd (R.817-822) Rulings effectively constitute findings that PRS
Corporation and other entities occupy the property. If others occupy the property how can
Ray nevertheless be entitled to rent the same property? If Ray could not re-let the subject
property, he also should not be entitled to $88,000.00 in "unpaid rent."
However, rather than requesting that the Trial Court make findings to support its
awards, Ray would have the Appellate Court usurp the trial judge's role as trier of fact.
This is so because Ray does not ask the Appellate Court to remand the case and instruct
the Trial Court to change its rulings on the topic. Rather, Ray asks the Appellate Court to
find that no one occupied the subject property, and that the lease between Ray and PRS
Corporation was abandoned. Ray would then have the Court award treble damages based
on its own findings.
PRS LLC agrees that the dichotomy between rent and damages should not matter.
However, based on the Trial Court's rulings, this distinction does matter. As the Trial
Court determined that Ray suffered no actual damages, he should be awarded $00.00 as
"unpaid rent".
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ARGUMENT ON
CROSS-APPELLANT
RAY HUNTING'S APPEAL

ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY RULED THAT THE PLAINTIFF SUFFERED NO
ACTUAL DAMAGES, AND IMPLIEDLY RULED THAT THERE ARE NO DAMAGE
AMOUNTS TO TREBLE

A.
The Trial Court properly denied treble damages but improperly
awarded Ray a judgment of $88,000.00.
The Trial Court properly denied treble damages. The Trial Court expressly ruled
that Ray suffered no actual damage.16 Therefore, PRS LLC submits that the Trial Court
impliedly ruled that there are no damage amounts to treble. However, as is argued supra
in PRS LLC's Brief of Appellant, the Trial Court's attempt to grant $88,000.00 as rent
rather than damages is clearly improper pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-36-10.
B.
Treble damages are not proper because PRS Inc. is in possession and
was not joined as a party.
PRS LLC does not dispute that Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-10 mandates treble
damages in appropriate circumstances where damages are properly awarded. However, in
this case, as previously argued, the Court properly ruled that there were no actual
damages because there are other parties, including the tenant (PRS Inc.) under a written
lease agreement, in possession of the premises.17 Thus, following Perkins, supra, the_
16

The Trial Court in its July 2, 2007, Ruling (R.817-822) found that Ray "suffered
no actual damage/' See page 4 of the Ruling (R.820). The Court's finding was based on
the fact that Ray did not have a right to possess the premises because there were other
non-parties in actual possession, including PRS Inc. who is a tenant under a written lease
agreement. On that basis the Trial Court stated, 'Therefore, on this basis, the court
hereby denies Plaintiffs request for any treble damages in this matter. See Id.
17

PRS LLC reiterates the fact that the Trial Court found that there are others in
possession of the premises, including the Tenant (PRS Inc.) under a written lease
agreement. In the Trial Court's January 8, 2007, Ruling (R.577-580), the Trial Court
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specifically found and acknowledged the lease agreement and the presence of PRS Inc. on
the premises when it stated:
Having reviewed the records, and according to the pleadings submitted by
both parties, the Court believes that there are third parties which have not
been made a part of this lawsuit, but which have rights related to the
underlying property. In particular, the Court is aware that there is a lease
between the Plaintiff and [PRS Inc.], which lease was the crux of the
Defendant's motion to dismiss and opposition to the Plaintiffs motion for
summary judgment. In fact, both parties, to some extent, have relied upon
the existence of PRS, Inc. in arguing their positions.. . . Therefore, the
Court is reluctant to issue an order at this time restoring possession of the
subject property to the Plaintiff.
The Court is puzzled as to why these other parties (particularly PRS,
Inc.) have not been made part of this lawsuit. It would appear that the
Plaintiff is seeking to regain exclusive possession of the subject property,
yet the Plaintiff has failed to join at lease one seemingly necessary party.
See R.577-78.
The Court again found in its February 2, 2007, Ruling (R.594-599), that the Tenant
(PRS Inc.), under a written lease agreement, and others, are in possession of the premises
when it stated:
However, in this case, there are other parties presently in possession of
the subject property whose rights have not yet been adjudicated. At least
one the these parties has entered into a lease agreement with the Plaintiff.
See R.595. (Emphasis added.)
The Trial Court further stated in the February 2, 2007, Ruling, as follows:
The Court instructed the parties to prepare to address the issue of joining
other seeming necessary parties to this lawsuit. Having review (sic.) the
argument of the parties and the applicable law, the Court is still not
convinced that PRS, Inc. is not a necessary party to this suit, insofar as
it ippears to the Court that the Plaintiff desires to re-enter and obtain full
possession of the subject property. In granting Plaintiffs motion for
summary judgment, the Court had only adjudicated the rights between Ray
Hunting and PRS, LLC. However, as stated above, an adjudication of those
-30-

Trial Court properly found that there were no actual damages and nothing to treble.
C.

Reasonableness of damages argument is unavailing.

Ray's extensive argument on the issue of reasonable damages is unavailing in light
of the Trial Court's ruling that there are no actual damages. The question of
reasonableness of damages is not before this court. In deed, the Trial Court, not the Court
of Appeals, is the proper forum for an argument as to reasonableness of damages.
Before the question of reasonable damages comes into play, Ray needs to first
convince this Court that it should ignore Perkins and hold that the Trial Court erred when
it failed to rule that there are actual damages, other than nominal, that should be awarded
despite that fact that the Trial Court also found that there is a Tenant (PRS Inc.) in
possession under a written lease agreement who was not joined to this lawsuit as
specifically required by Utah Code Ann. §78-36-7 and Rule 19 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure. Only after that hurdle is crossed can the Trial Court make a determination as
to reasonableness of damages. Thus, any argument on that issue before this Court should
not be well taken.

rights does not allow the Court to restore complete possession of the subject
property to the Plaintiff. It is clear to the Court that there exists a lease
between PRS, I n c . . . . and the Plaintiff. The rights and obligations that
flow from that lease agreement have not been adjudicated at this time. It
appears that [PRS, Inc.] and PRS Holdings, Inc. have been in
possession of the subject property this entire time. Yet none of those
parties have been brought within the jurisdiction of this Court through
service of process or appearance in the matter.
See R.596. (Emphasis added.)
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D.
Pearce v. Shurtz, Tanner v. Lawler, and Pickney v. Snideman do not
support any proposition that Utah Code Ann. 78-36-7 does not require that
PRS Inc. should have been joined to this lawsuit.
Ray presents to this Court the cases of Pearce v. Shurtz, 270 P.2d 442 (Utah 1954),
Tanner v. Lawler, 305 P.2d 882 (Utah 1957), and Pickney v. Snidmen, 2000 UT App. 275
(unpublished memorandum decision), for the proposition that Utah Code Ann. §78-36-7
does not required PRS Inc. to be joined to this lawsuit. Ray also argued these same cases
before the Trial Court. See the Trial Court's Ruling attached as Exhibit "G" to the
Addendum to Ray's Brief. The Trial Court properly distinguished these cases from the
case at hand and properly determined that they do not support the proposition that Utah
Code Ann. §78-36-7 does not require Ray to join PRS Inc. to this lawsuit.18
18

The Trial Court in its February 2, 2007, Ruling (R.594-599) distinguished the
Tanner case from the case at hand because Tanner involved a third party not in
possession who voluntarily intervened into the action. The Trial Court in it Ruling stated:
Here, it appears to the Court that PRS entities (including PRS, LLC; [PRS
Inc.]; and PRS Holdings, Inc.) have all enjoyed concurrent possession of the
subject property and that only PRS, LLC's rights have been adjudicated at
this time, the other parties not having been joined to the action.
See R.596.
The Trial Court also distinguished Pickney because that case involved a party who
was in sole possession of the property as issue. The Trial Court stated:
Here, there is ample reason to believe that PRS, LLC is not the sole party in
possession of the subject property. The fact that PRS, LLC's name appears
on the rent check does not, in and of itself make PRS, LLC the only tenant,
especially in light of the lease agreement executed between the Plaintiff and
PRS, Inc., which rights and obligations have not yet been adjudicated.
See R.597.
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By again arguing these cases before this Court after the Trial Court properly
distinguished them, Ray is trying to have this Court believe that PRS Inc. was not in
possession of the subject property despite the numerous findings of the Trial Court to the
contrary.
E.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-7 clearly mandates that PRS Inc. be joined as
a party to this action.

PRS LLC would like to point out to the Court that Ray, on footnote 35 in Ray's
Brief, misquoted the 2005 version of Utah Code Ann. §78-36-7, by stating, "wherein the
2005 version provides that no other person then the tenant and subtenant if there is one in
possession "shall" be made a party to defendant in the proceeding."19 Ray's restatement
of the statute as he did in footnote 35 confuses the meaning of the statute. Clearly this

Finally, the Trial Court distinguished Pearce because a party who it was claimed
was an indispensable party was not in possession of the subject property and because he
previously assigned his interest in the subject property. The Trial Court stated:
Because Lewelien was apparently not in possession of the property, it was
not required that Lewelien be joined as a necessary party, and Pierce could
lawfully proceed against Shurtz, Wright, and Johnson (i.e., the parties in
possession). Here, as stated above, the Defendant and the other PRS
entities appear to have enjoyed concurrent possession of the subject
property.
See R.597.
19

The text of the 2005 version of Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-7 is reproduced as
Exhibit A" to the Addendum to Ray's Brief, in pertinent part, as follows:
U

No person other than the tenant of the premises, and subtenant if there is
one in the actual occupation of the premises when the action is commenced,
shall be made a party defendant in the proceeding . ...
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statute in its original text mandates that PRS Inc., as a Tenant in possession, be made a
party to this action.
II.

T H E TRIAL COURT'S FAILURE TO REQUIRE ADHERENCE TO RULE 19 LIMITED ITS
ABILITY TO PROPERLY RULE ON THE ISSUE OF DAMAGES

PRS LLC acknowledges that the Trial Court's failure to require adherence to Rule
19 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure limited its ability to properly rule on the issue of
damages. PRS LLC agrees with Ray's assertions that UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-36-10
mandates treble damages when a defendant is found to be in unlawful detainer. However,
PRS LLC argues that UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-36-10 should never become applicable
unless and until proper parties are joined pursuant to Rule 19 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure in addition to those parties necessary to maintain an action for unlawful
detainer pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-36-7.
III.

UTAH'S FORCIBLE ENTRY AND DETAINER A C T SEEKS TO SAFEGUARD PROPERTY
RIGHTS AND IS NOT AIMED AT GENERATING THEORETICAL DAMAGE INCOME FOR
LANDLORDS

Utah's Forcible Entry and Detainer Act seeks to safeguard property rights and is
not aimed at generating theoretical damage income for landlords. As stated supra, the
Trial Court properly found that there are other entities in possession, including the tenant
PRS Inc. under a written lease agreement, who have possessory interests. Utah Code
Ann. § 78-36-7 clearly intends to protect those interests by mandating the joining of these
parties in an eviction action. These entities have not been joined nor have they entered
appearances. Therefore, under Perkins, supra, there is no basis for any damages; and, it
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was improper for the Court to impose a rent obligation on PRS LLC who was present
with the permission of the tenant PRS Inc.
As previously argued herein, to impose such an obligation in effect grants the
landlord additional rent to which he is not entitled given the fact that he has already
leased the premises to another entity (PRS Inc.) who is in possession and who is not a
party to the suit. Because of the lease agreement, Ray cannot re-let the premises. How
can Ray then be entitled to $88,000 in unpaid rent from PRS LLC who is not a party to
the lease? Therefore, the Trial Court did err in granting judgment to Ray against PRS
LLC for unpaid rent in the amount of $88,000 but properly concluded that there are no
actual damages.
Inasmuch as the Trial Court properly concluded that Ray suffered no actual
damages, it is nonsensical to award treble damages on legal theory. As previously
argued, the statute does not require damages in this instance, as Ray should not have been
allowed to maintain the action without complying with UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-36-7.

CONCLUSION
The Court must ultimately decide whether the Unlawful Detainer statute should be
amended to allow a landlord to shop for the weakest defendant, by joining none of the
other parties in possession of the subject property. This change will violate Rule 19 and
circumvent UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-36-7. Such a change would allow landlords to
effectively recover theoretical and/or punitive damages because in these instances there
are no actual damages.
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In the case at bar, the Landlord has no right to the possession and use of the
property. However, Ray should not have been allowed to even maintain the action
without complying with UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-36-7. Rule 19 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure mandates that necessary parties for complete relief be joined, and puts the
obligation on the plaintiff to accomplish the joinder. Pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 7836-10, complete relief in an unlawful detainer action "shall include an order for the
restitution of the premises." UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-36-10(1). On this basis, the Trial
Court's ruling on Summary Judgement in favor of Ray should be set aside, and the case
should be remanded for dismissal or joinder of proper parties.
The Trial Court correctly found that Ray suffered no actual damages. Therefore,
only nominal damages, not "unpaid rent" should have been awarded.

WHEREFORE, PRS LLC respectfully prays that the Utah Court of Appeals will:
1.

Reverse the Trial Court's granting of summary judgment in favor of
the Plaintiff and remand the matter back to the Trial Court,
instructing the Trial Court to consider PRS LLC's possession in light
of the lease agreement and PRS Inc.'s right of possession thereunder.

2.

Remand the matter back to the Trial Court instructing the court to
merge this case with Pipe Renewal Service Management, Inc. v Ray
Hunting and Marilyn Hunting. Case No. 070800889, which is
currently pending before Judge John R. Anderson, and which
involves the same leasehold, parties, and lease agreement which are
the subject of this appeal, and which arose out of this litigation.

3.

Reverse the Trial Court's determination that Plaintiff is entitled to
judgement in the amount $88,174.50.
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Respectfully submitted this 20th day of June, 2008.

DANIEL S. SAM
Attorney for Appellant/Cross-Appellee
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